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Terry AND Miranda: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE FouRTH AND FITH
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Thomas Gerry Bulkin
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a collision occurring in the federal circuit courts of appeal between the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution.' The conflict is
due to the lack of clear direction from the United States Supreme Court on the
amount of force police officers may exert under the Terry doctrine before a sus-
pect is deemed to be in "custody."2 The hazy line delineating "custody" raises two
questions. First, at what point do indicia of arrest make a Terry stop custodial for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment, thereby giving rise to a probable cause
requirement for validity? Second, when does a Terry stop become custodial for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment, thus requiring Miranda warnings to protect any
possible statements of admission made by the individual?
This conflict between the custody requirements of Terry and Miranda is a consti-
tutional issue which has arisen in the past decade.3 The federal circuit courts' recent
expansion of the amount of force police officers may use in a valid Terry stop has
created ambiguity in the meaning of custody as applied by each amendment.!
A. The Original Scope of Terry
In 1968, the Court in Terry v. Ohio created an exception to the probable cause
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.' The Court envisioned this exception as
a very "narrowly" defined intrusion allowed to police officers based on a reason-
able suspicion of the presence of a weapon and the officers' concern for their
safety.' The court defined these intrusions as non-custodial for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment despite the clearly evident restriction on the freedom of the
individual.7 The fact that the Court viewed Terry stops as very limited and non-
custodial in nature allowed these intrusions to be insulated from any analysis
under the 1966 Miranda decision.8
B. The Scope of Miranda
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court analyzed the moment at which a person
should reasonably be considered "in custody" for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment.' In other words, the Court attempted to set a standard for determin-
1. Mark A. Godsey, When Terry Met Miranda: Two Constitutional Doctrines Collide, 63 FORDHAM L. REv.
715 (1994).
2. Godsey, supra note 1, at 715. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
3. Godsey, supra note 1, at 715; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4. United States v. Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221, 1224-25 (7th Cir. 1994).
5. Terry, 392 U.S. at 1.
6. Id. at 23.
7. Id. at 29-31.
8. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984).
9. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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ing when a person's freedom is so restricted that the person becomes entitled to
warnings regarding their constitutional rights.
The Court held that when individuals are taken into police "custody," they are
entitled to be advised of their constitutional right against self-incrimination
before being subjected to interrogation by officers. ' The determination of "cus-
tody" is essential to the holding of the Court. The Court decided that, for pur-
poses of the Fifth Amendment and Miranda, a person is "in custody" when his
freedom of action is restricted in any significant way." When this degree of
restriction occurs, the person "in custody" must be advised of his constitutional
rights before being questioned. 2
C. The Original Balance Struck by the Court
It is clear from the analysis of "custody" in both Terry and Miranda that the
Supreme Court did not intend Miranda and the Fifth Amendment to be implicat-
ed during "non-custodial" Terry stops. 3 In arriving at this conclusion, the Court
in Berkemer v. McCarty addressed the investigatory stop of a suspected drunk
driver by an Ohio State Trooper."4 The Court, in holding that the stop was non-
custodial and the statements gathered were admissible, stated that Miranda and
its warnings are not triggered in a traditional Terry stop. 5 However, the Court
never intended the intrusion under a Terry stop to reach the level of custody
required to trigger Miranda and its warnings.16
The balance originally struck by the Court has been shaken recently by the
holdings of six federal circuits allowing certain indicia of arrest during Terry
stops.'7 By indicia of arrest, the courts popularly refer to protective measures
such as drawn weapons, the use of handcuffs, and placing suspects in the lying-
prone position on the ground. These measures have received approval in the
aforementioned circuits as acceptable methods of protecting officers during
investigatory stops such as that contemplated by the Terry decision. 8
The resulting tenuous balance has made it unclear when a suspect, subjected to
intrusive indicia of arrest, is "in custody" for purposes of Miranda and the Fifth
Amendment." The question then becomes, when is a person who is handcuffed
on the ground at gunpoint sufficiently "in custody" to expect that the require-
ments of probable cause and the warnings of Miranda are in play on his behalf?
D. The Practical Application
The conflict between Terry and Miranda is most clearly understandable when
applied to actual events. Police officers are often called upon to investigate the
10. Id. at 439.
11. Id. at 444.
12. Id.
13. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440.
14. Id. at 423.
15. Id. at 440.
16. Id.
17. See Godsey, supra note 1, at 729.
18. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 420.
19. See Godsey, supra note 1, at 715.
[VOL. 18:199
1998] THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE FOURTHAND FIFTHAMENDMENTS 201
suspicious activities of potentially dangerous suspects. In these situations, it has
become acceptable police practice, when reasonable, to stop suspects at gunpoint
and use handcuffs to secure the scene before the investigatory questioning of the
Terry stop begins.2 This practice has developed to protect the officers, the pub-
lic, and the suspect from potential violence. 21 Officers who are able to take con-
trol of a situation before it erupts into violence are in a better position to protect
everyone involved. However, as courts have held that these indicia of arrest are
acceptable when reasonably necessary for protection, they have simultaneously
been inconsistent in deciding whether the suspect is "in custody," both for pur-
poses of the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment and the self-
incrimination protections of the Fifth Amendment.
2
The difficulty arises in that these indicia of arrest would seem to be "custodial"
in light of the Fifth Amendment and its definition of "custody" in Miranda.22
Clearly, a reasonable person held at gunpoint, handcuffed and lying prone in the
street would feel his freedom had been restricted in a significant way.24 Yet, the
Supreme Court seems to state otherwise. 2 The Court intimated in Berkemer that
Miranda was not implicated during a Terry stop despite defining "custody" as
any significant restraint on freedom. 2' Additionally, the Court held in Florida v.
Bostick that a reasonable innocent person is in custody for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment when they no longer feel free to terminate the encounter with the
police!27 Surely a person held at gunpoint does not feel free to terminate his
encounter with the police. Nevertheless, courts have continued to allow greater
indicia of arrest under the rule in Terry, thereby insulating the entire stop from
analysis under Miranda.28
The conflicting treatment of the custody issue is at the heart of the confusion
regarding the concurrent application of Terry and Miranda.29 Should the courts
continue to allow indicia of arrest to be used under the protection of Terry and
the Fourth Amendment, or must officers show probable cause when using
extreme indicia of arrest against individuals and then provide the protective
warnings of Miranda under the Fifth Amendment?
As previously mentioned, some of the options facing the Supreme Court, as it
waits for an opportune time to rule on this unclear and complex aspect of the law,
will be outlined and discussed herein. First, however, it is important to fully
understand the Supreme Court's decisions at the base of this present conflict.
20. United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1464 (10th Cir. 1993).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1461-62.
23. See Godsey, supra note 1, at 715.
24. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
25. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,440 (1984).
26. Id. at 420; see Godsey, supra note 1, at 715.
27. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
28. United States v. Tilmon, 19 F3d 1221, 1226 (7th Cir. 1994).
29. See Godsey, supra note 1, at 715.
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II. ANALYSIS OF Terry v. Ohio
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that the people
have the right to be "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures."" The Fourth Amendment further states,
"no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause."3 1 One of the rules which has
been derived from this amendment states that unless an arresting officer has
probable cause to believe that a crime has been or is being committed, the arrest
becomes invalid. 32 The Constitution, however, leaves room in the language of the
Fourth Amendment for interpretation by the courts. The Fourth Amendment
clearly protects the individual's right to be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion.3 However, the Constitution does not forbid all intrusion by the gov-
ernment - only unreasonable ones. 4 It is upon that language that the Terry
exception to the probable cause requirement is founded.
A. The Facts of Terry
The facts in Terry are as follows: Detective Martin McFadden was on the
"beat" he had patrolled for 30 years as an officer with the Cleveland Police
Department. McFadden noticed Terry and his associate, Chilton, alternately
proceed down the block, conspicuously look through a particular jewelry store
window, and wander back to the street corner.3 This exercise took place approxi-
mately twelve times per individual and was interrupted only by a suspicious con-
ference with a third man, Katz. 37 Based on his experience and his observations,
Detective McFadden believed that at least Terry and Chilton were involved in
"casing" the particular store for a "stick-up."38 Since "stick-ups" usually involve
a weapon, McFadden was cautious as he approached the trio, which had
regrouped in front of Zucker's store. 9
McFadden questioned the men regarding their activity, and their mumbled
response did nothing to allay his suspicions.' At this point, McFadden grabbed
Terry, spun him around, and patted the outside of his clothing in an effort to discover
if he was armed." Upon feeling what immediately resembled a pistol, McFadden
reached inside Terry's overcoat and extracted a .38 caliber pistol from the pocket."'
A subsequent outer clothing pat-down of Chilton uncovered yet another weapon.
Terry and Chilton were arrested for carrying concealed weapons."
30. U.S. CONST. amend. IV
31. Id.
32. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 605 (1975).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. IV
34. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 272 (1960)).
35. Id. at 5.
36. Id. at 6.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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B. The Rule in Terry
Detective McFadden did not have probable cause to arrest Terry and Chilton
when he approached them based on their suspicious behavior."5 However, the
Terry Court carved out an exception to the probable cause requirement of the
Fourth Amendment.46 The Court recognized "that in dealing with the rapidly
unfolding and often dangerous situations on city streets the police are in need of
an escalating set of flexible responses, graduated in relation to the amount of
information they possess."47
C. The Justification for the Rule
Because the right to be free from governmental intrusion is so valued in
American jurisprudence, the Court felt obliged to carefully balance the intrusion
to be effectuated against the rights to be intruded upon.' The Court stated that a
balancing of interests is required where the interests of the government must be
weighed against the intrusion upon the individual.4 9 The Court said the govern-
ment has a valuable interest in the effective prevention of crime and the detention
of criminals."0 In addition, and even more importantly, the government also has a
significant interest in the safety of its officers enforcing the law." The Court rec-
ognized that it would certainly be "unreasonable to require that police officers
take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties."52 The Court noted that
"American criminals have a long tradition of armed violence, and every year in
this country many law enforcement officers are killed in the line of duty, and
thousands more are wounded."5 3 With this in mind, the Court fashioned the
exception to the probable cause requirement known as the Terry stop and frisk. '
The holding in Terry states:
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably
to conclude ... that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and ... dangerous ... he is entitled to con-
duct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons to discover
[the presence] of weapons ......
In Terry, Detective McFadden's reasonable suspicion that Terry and Chilton were
planning a crime in which a weapon is usually employed was sufficient for the
Court to hold that his suspicions were "specific and articulable" and that "taken
together with rational inferences" from those and the surrounding facts, "reason-
ably warrant[ed] that intrusion."5"
45. Id. at 20.
46. Id. at 30.
47. Id. at 10.
48. Id. at 20-21.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 22.
51. Id. at 23-24.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 23.
54. Id. at 27.
55. Id. at 30.
56. Id. at 21.
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This indicates that the Court is willing to accept a general belief that an indi-
vidual is involved in a crime that usually includes a weapon, rather than a specif-
ic belief that this individual has a weapon." The Court stated that "[t]he officer
need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a
reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief
that his safety or that of others was in danger."'
After conferring the exception to the probable cause requirement upon law
enforcement, the Court then defined it as a narrow exception. 9 The Court stated
that "[a] search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest ... must
.. . be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.""0
"Thus it must be limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons
which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby . "..."61 The justifica-
tion for the search is based on the need to protect police officers by discovering
the presence of any possible weapons.62 The search must therefore be "confined
in scope" to that end.6
D. The Test in Terry
The Court outlined a test to determine whether an intrusion is reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment. 64 The Court defined the pertinent questions as, (1) were
the officers' actions justified at the inception of the stop; and (2) was the
"seizure". "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place."65 The Court applied its new two-part test to
Detective McFadden's actions and found that "McFadden confined his search
strictly to what was minimally necessary to learn whether the men were armed
and to disarm them once he discovered the weapons."66 This, the Court deter-
mined, satisfied the test for reasonableness.67
While the Court in Terry did its best to articulate a clear definition of a non-
intrusive investigatory stop, it openly admitted that the Fourth Amendment does
not spell out the limitations placed upon searches and seizures for protective pur-
poses.' They conceded that each case is different, and the rules will have to "be
developed in the concrete factual circumstances of individual cases. '69 This lan-
guage is the opening through which the lower federal courts have proceeded on
their path to expanding the permissible scope of police action in a Terry stop.
57. Id. at 27.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 25-26.
61. Id. at 26.
62. Id. at 29.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 20-21.
65. Id. at 20.
66. Id. at 30.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 29.
69. Id.
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III. THE EXPANSION OF THE Terry STOP
The expansion by the federal circuit courts of the amount of force permissible
under a Terry stop was not inadvertent and has not gone unnoticed." For exam-
ple, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Chaidez71 recog-
nized that "in the recent past, the 'permissible reasons for a stop and search and
the permissible scope of the intrusion [under the Terry doctrine] have expanded
beyond their original contours."'' ' Similarly, the Tenth Circuit, in its holding in
United States v. Perdue, stated that the last decade "has witnessed a multifaceted
expansion of Terry . . . [including the] trend granting officers greater latitude in
using force in order to 'neutralize' potentially dangerous suspects during an
investigatory detention."73 The aforementioned cases' recognition and approval
of the expansion of the bounds of Terry cleared the path for the most recent, and
possibly most dramatic, example of the expansion of Terry.74
In United States v. Tilmon,7 s a bank robbery occurred in Eau Claire, Wisconsin,
in the late morning.76 The suspect took a moderate sum of cash and managed to
escape.77 The description the police broadcast over the radio was that of a "black
male in his early twenties, 5 [feet] 10 [inches] tall and weighing 160 pounds.
7 8
A description of the suspect's clothes and vehicle were also broadcast to all local
and state agencies.79
Later that same day, Trooper Lewis of the Wisconsin Highway Patrol observed
a "blue Mustang with a gray stripe, bearing Minnesota license plates."8 This
vehicle exactly matched the description of the suspect's getaway car.8 Lewis and
his back-up units drove beside the Mustang and determined that the driver was
indeed a black male.2 Based on these facts, the troopers performed a "felony
stop" on Tilmon, now a bank robbery suspect.8 Tilmon complied with the
request to get out of his vehicle.' At all times, weapons were pointed at him.85
Tilmon was ordered to lie down on the pavement, and as he complied, a shotgun
was pointed at his head.86 The shotgun remained on Tilmon until he was hand-
cuffed and placed in a patrol car.87 At the scene, Tilmon's Mustang was com-
pletely blocked by Highway Patrol vehicles.88
70. See Godsey, supra note 1, at 715.
71. 919 E2d 1193 (7th Cir. 1990).
72. United States v. Tilmon, 19 E3d 1221, 1224 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Chaidez, 919 E2d at 1198).
73. United States v. Perdue, 8 E3d 1455, 1464 (10th Cir. 1993).
74. Tilmon, 19 E3d at 1221.
75. Id.
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Tilmon argued unsuccessfully that the Terry stop performed by the troopers was
unlawful because it was based merely on the suspicion that he was the suspected
bank robber and yet used force that was indicative of a full arrest requiring proba-
ble cause.89 Tilmon further argued that the use of drawn weapons, handcuffs; hav-
ing him lie on the pavement, and being surrounded by officers was sufficient to
raise the investigatory stop to the level of a constructive arrest.9 The court recog-
nized that probable cause may be required where a seizure, though not technically
an arrest, becomes indistinguishable in content from a traditional arrest. 1 The
court then began its analysis of this obviously intrusive stop.
The Tilmon court began by recognizing that the amount of force allowable dur-
ing a Terry stop has significantly increased since the Terry decision was first
delivered. 2 They recognized that the judicial trend has been to expand the powers
given to law enforcement officers under the original doctrine and to allow them to
use greater measures of force in an effort to "neutralize" suspects which present a
potential danger during an investigatory stop.93 The court went on to say that
"[flor better or for worse, the trend has led to permitting the use of handcuffs, the
placing of suspects in police cruisers, the drawing of weapons and other measures
of force more traditionally associated with arrest than with investigatory deten-
tion' 9 ' While the court recognized that an escalation had occurred in the force
allowable under Terry, it also recognized the harrowing alternative. The Tilmon
court cited the language in United States v. Serna-Barreto stating that:
Although we are troubled by the thought of allowing policemen to stop
people at the point of a gun when probable cause to arrest is lacking, we
are unwilling to hold that an investigative stop is never lawful when it
can be effectuated safely only in that manner. It is not nice to have a gun
pointed at you by a policeman but it is worse to have a gun pointed at
you by a criminal, so there is a complex tradeoff involved in any propos-
al to reduce (or increase) the permissible scope of investigatory stops. 6
With that in mind, the Tilmon court sought to fashion a rule by which the force
used could be balanced against the justification for the intrusion.9" For guidance,
the Tilmon court looked to the holdings in Terry and Chaidez. Terry articulated
that the test is one of reasonableness which is embodied in the Fourth
Amendment. 8 The Terry test balances the intensity and scope of the intrusion on
the individual against the importance of the governmental interests justifying the
intrusion.9 In Chaidez, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he reasonableness of a
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1226.
91. Id. at 1224 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 201 (1979)).
92. United States v. Tilmon, 19 E3d 1221, 1224 (7th Cir. 1994).
93. Id. (citing United States v. Perdue, 8 E3d 1455, 1464 (10th Cir. 1993)).
94. Id. at 1224-25.
95. Id. at 1227.
96. 7ilmon, 19 E3d at 1227 (citing United States v. Serna-Barreto, 842 F.2d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 1988)).
97. Id. at 1226.
98. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 31 (1968).
99. Id. at 29.
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particular stop depends in turn on the extent of the intrusion on the rights of the
individual as well as on the reason for the restraint."'10
Using these holdings as precedent, the Tilmon court sought to clarify the test
for reasonableness under the "expanded" Terry stop."0' The Seventh Circuit held
that "[i]n assessing the reasonableness of a Terry stop, the facts are 'judged
against an objective standard: [W]ould the facts available to the officer at the
moment of the seizure or the search "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief" that the action taken was appropriate?'"102 In other words, "[t]he totality
of the circumstances controls."' 03 "The process does not deal with hard certain-
ties, but with probabilities."' 4
The rule enunciated in Tilmon is obviously expansive and lacks definite bound-
aries. Realizing this, the court attempted to justify its holding by recognizing that
a judicial pragmatism was necessary to adapt the holdings of the Court to the
dynamic environment of the streets.105 A rule that was too restrictive would not be
flexible enough to react to the myriad factual and circumstantial scenarios that
would surely arise."0 This justification for a flexible test was given by the
Supreme Court in Florida v. Royer,"0 7 stating that "[g]iven the 'endless variations
in the facts and circumstances,' there is no 'litmus-paper test for determining
when a seizure exceeds the bounds of an investigative stop' and becomes an
arrest."'0 8 Additionally, the Court cited the language in Michigan v. Long1"9 for
justification in stating that it "is not surprising that '[i]nvestigative detentions
involving suspects in vehicles is fraught with danger to police officers."' 0.
Despite its expansiveness, the holding in Tilmon is the natural extension of
Terry in adapting to a world that is much more violent than that of 1968. In
Terry, the Court allowed McFadden to "frisk" the suspicious individuals, not
because he had factual evidence to lead him to believe they were armed, but
rather, because he suspected them of a crime in which the perpetrators are usual-
ly armed.' In today's world, where criminals do not hesitate to shoot first and
ask questions later, it follows nicely that Terry should allow officers to perform
the same approach on a suspect like McFadden, based on the same suspicions,
but to also allow the officer to use the indicia of arrest necessary to protect him-
self. It defies reason to place an officer and a potentially dangerous suspect on
an "even playing field" in a game of "quick draw." If an officer is allowed to use
his drawn weapon to establish superiority over the suspect initially, it is much
less likely that the individual will attempt aggressive action, thereby protecting
the officer, innocent bystanders, and the suspect as well.
100. Tilmon, 19 F.3d at 1224 (quoting United States v. Chaidez, 919 E2d 1193, 1197 (7th Cir. 1990)).
101. Id.
102. Id. (quoting United States v. Adebayo, 985 F.2d 1333, 1339 (7th Cir. 1993)).
103. Id.
104. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,418 (1981).
105. Tilmon, 19 F.3d at 1224.
106. Id.
107. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
108. Tilmon, 19 E3d at 1224 (quoting Royer, 460 U.S. at 506).
109. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
110. Tilmon, 19 F.3d at 1226 (quoting Long, 463 U.S. at 1047).
Ill. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28 (1968).
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While expanding the rule from Terry, the Tilmon court adhered to the language
of Terry in stating that "[t]he reasonableness of an investigatory stop may be
determined by examining: (1) whether the police were aware of specific and
articulable facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion; and (2) whether the degree
of intrusion was reasonably related to the known facts."'1 2 "In other words, the
issue is [once again] whether the police conduct - given their suspicions and the
surrounding circumstances - was reasonable.""' 3 The court went on to say that
"[a] court in its assessment 'should take care to consider whether the police are
acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such cases the court should not
indulge in unrealistic second-guessing.""' In addition, "the fact that 'the protec-
tion of the public might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by 'less intru-
sive means' does not, by itself, render the search unreasonable."' ' . The Supreme
Court nevertheless suggests in Florida v. Royer, that "the investigative methods
employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or
dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time.""'
Other circuits have agreed with the ruling of the court in Tilmon. The Ninth
Circuit in United States v. Greene stated that "[t]he mere use or display of force
in making a stop does not necessarily transform a stop into an arrest if the sur-
rounding circumstances give rise to a justifiable fear for [the] personal safety" of
the officer."7 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit held in United States v. Perdue that
officers were justified in ordering an individual out of his car at gunpoint and
onto the ground to be handcuffed where the individual was suspected of being
the resident of a home where extensive amounts of narcotics and weapons were
found." 8 In addition, the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Hardnett held that
using indicia of arrest or force during a stop will not necessarily transform the
stop into an arrest.' However, the "surrounding circumstances [must] give rise
to a justifiable fear for personal safety.""'2 In Hardnett, the court held that "a
seizure effectuated with weapons drawn may properly be considered an inves-
tigative stop."'
2'
Therefore, it appears that the definition of "custody" under the Fourth
Amendment currently used in the nine circuit courts which espouse the expanded
Terry stop is well-grounded in Supreme Court precedent.' 22 For instance, the
Terry Court clearly advocated a balancing test to determine whether a govern-
mental intrusion was reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances.'
23
Similarly, the Court in Florida v. Royer eschewed a "litmus-paper" test in recog-
112. 7ilmon, 19 F.3d at 1224 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1225 (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985)).
115. Id. (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973)).
116. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
117. United States v. Greene, 783 F.2d 1364, 1367-68 (9th Cir. 1986).
118. United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1463 (10th Cir. 1993).
119. United States v. Hardnett, 804 F.2d 353, 355 (6th Cir. 1986).
120. See Godsey, supra note 1, at 730 (quoting Hardnett, 804 F.2d at 357).
121. Hardnett, 804 F2d at 357.
122. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983); Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1463; Hardnett, 804 F.2d at 355; See
Godsey, supra note 1, at 730.
123. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968).
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nition that the facts of each case must be balanced based on reasonableness.
24
Finally, in Dunaway v. New York, the Court's willingness to allow intrusion
appeared to meet its boundary when police restraint was deemed so intrusive
under the circumstances that it amounted to a "constructive arrest."' 2 However,
allowing intrusion to the point of constructive arrest is actually the outermost
limit of permissible restraint. A person's restraint can hardly be more custodial
than when they are under formal arrest.
An apparent inconsistency arises, however, between the permissive balancing
tests of Terry, Royer and Dunaway and the Court's definition of custody in Florida
v. Bostick.'28 The Bostick Court described "seizure" as being the point at which a
reasonable person would no longer feel free to leave. 127 A somewhat more restric-
tive standard of custody. Arguably, any indicia of arrest would meet this defini-
tion and necessitate probable cause and Miranda warnings. However, Terry,
Royer and Dunaway are all distinguishable from Bostick in that they address
detention of individuals based on a reasonable suspicion that the individuals were
involved in criminal activity. 28 In those cases, the Supreme Court was addressing
the need for officers to safely detain potentially dangerous suspects based on the
Terry exception to the probable cause requirement. 129 The Court, in each case,
saw the need to allow flexibility in the responses available to police officers, and
the Court's treatment of custody in each of those cases reflects that end. 3'
The Court in Bostick was addressing a wholly different issue. In Bostick, offi-
cers boarded a bus to perform totally random consensual searches of passengers'
bags.'31 This is an intrusion into the privacy of individuals, not only without
probable cause, but lacking even reasonable suspicion. 3 2 Therefore, it is easy to
see why the Court would apply a stricter standard of "custody" in an effort to
protect individuals from baseless police intrusion. Thus the rule in Bostick,
which announced that an individual is considered seized when he no longer feels
free to terminate the police encounter.'" Bostick, and its defintion of custody, is
not applicable to investigatory stops performed under the Terry doctrine based on
reasonable suspicion.
In summary, the Supreme Court's varying treatment of "custody" under the
Fourth Amendment has fluctuated in relation to the reasonableness of the intru-
sion upon the individual. 34 Where the intrusion has been based on a reasonable
governmental interest, the Supreme Court has been willing to allow the intrusion
as long as it remains balanced against the individual's right to be free from such
124. Royer, 460 U.S. at 506.
125. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 214-16 (1979).
126. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
127. Id. at434.
128. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434; Royer, 460 U.S. at 506; Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 214-21.
129. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434; Royer, 460 U.S. at 506; Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 214-21.
130. Royer, 460 U.S. at 491; Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 200; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968).
131. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 433-34.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 434.
134. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,441 (1984).
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intrusion. ' However, the intrusion still has been required to remain less intru-
sive than a formal arrest in order to avoid the requirement of probable cause.13
To fully understand the conflict at issue, it is necessary to examine "custody"
under the Fifth Amendment and its protector, the Miranda Doctrine. 37
IV FIFTH AMENDMENT CUSTODY AND Miranda
The Fifth Amendment states, "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any
Criminal Case to be a witness against himself"1" In Miranda, the Court recog-
nized the coercive nature of police custody and interrogation which affect the
ability of an individual to make choices based on free will.139
The Court recognized there is a point during a police encounter where the pres-
sures exerted by officers create an atmosphere which is coercive in and of
itself.14 An individual subjected to these pressures is not sufficiently in com-
mand of his decision-making processes to give valid consent.141 The Court rea-
soned that when a defendant is "thrust" into the "unfamiliar atmosphere" of a
police station and "run through menacing police interrogation procedures, . . .
[t]he potentiality for compulsion is forcefully apparent." 42 They further stated
that "[t]he current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one
of our Nation's most cherished principles-that the individual may not be com-
pelled to incriminate himself."'43 Therefore, a rule was fashioned for the protec-
tion of criminal defendants. The Court stated "[u]nless adequate protective
devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surround-
ings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his
free choice." '44
The Court mandated that this constitutional safeguard shall apply to defendants
who are subjected to a police-initiated atmosphere of "custodial interrogation." 4
Miranda defines "interrogation" as "questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers." '46 It is clear, however, that interrogation may be coercive in many
forms not as obvious as direct questioning. 47 Nevertheless, interrogation usually
means express questioning."
The Supreme Court, in addressing Fifth Amendment custody, seems to be
more consistent with its Fourth Amendment pronouncements than the circuit
courts. The Supreme Court in Miranda states that a person is in custody when he
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See United States. v. Perdue, 8 E3d 1455, 1464 (10th Cir. 1993).
138. U.S. CONST. amend. V
139. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 458.
142. Id. at 457.
143. Id. at 457-58.
144. Id. at458.
145. Id. at467.
146. Id. at 444.
147. Id.
148. See Godsey, supra note I, at 721.
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has been taken into custody or deprived of freedom in a significant way. 49 The
Court continued in California v. Beheler to say that the deprivation of freedom
mentioned in Miranda must be such that it is "associated with formal arrest."
150
Therefore, it appears that the Supreme Court has defined custody, under both the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, as an intrusion which, under the circumstances,
would make a reasonable person believe they were under formal arrest."'
Therefore, the Supreme Court's definition of "custody" appears reasonably
consistent under both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. A person is in custody
when his freedom has been restricted by the police in such a significant way that
he may reasonably believe he is under formal arrest. Under this definition, any
Terry stop, based on reasonable suspicion, must fall short of an actual or con-
structive arrest or be subject to the requirements of probable cause. Such a Terry
stop, not rising to the level of a formal arrest, would never trigger Miranda. This,
in essence, was the holding in Berkemer v. McCarty which stated that Miranda is
not implicated during a "routine" Terry stop.
52
V THE INTERACTION BETWEEN Terry AND Miranda
Having arrived at a consistent Supreme Court definition of custody, the circuit
court decisions must be examined to reveal the source of the conflict between the
practical application of the doctrines of Terry and Miranda. This conflict has
arisen in the past decade with the expansion of Terry in the circuit courts of
appeal. 5 3 In nine federal circuits, the use of certain indicia of arrest, which may
lead a reasonable person to believe he is under formal arrest, are allowed as non-
custodial under a greatly expanded version of the Terry doctrine.' 54
As an investigatory Terry stop escalates in force in response to potential dan-
ger, certain indicia of arrest have been approved by many federal circuit courts as
appropriate tools for "neutralizing the perceived threat.' 55  These indicia of
arrest include drawn weapons, the use of handcuffs, being forced to the ground,
and being placed in a police cruiser.5 6 There is little doubt that a reasonable per-
son subjected to these indicia of arrest would feel restrained to a "degree associ-
ated with formal arrest." ' 7 Use of these indicia of arrest would seem to satisfy
the test for "custody" under the Fifth Amendment and require Miranda warnings
be given in the event of questioning. 5 8 However, many federal circuit courts
have allowed such indicia of arrest to be utilitzed against a suspect without hold-
ing that the suspect was in custody for Fourth Amendment purposes, thereby sep-
arating the analysis of custody under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
5 9
149. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 436 (1966).
150. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1124-25 (1983).
151. Id. at 1125.
152. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984).
153. See Godsey, supra note 1, at 715.
154. United States v. Perdue, 8 E3d 1455, 1464 (10th Cir. 1993).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1462-64.
157. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)).
158. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 436 (1966).
159. Perdue, 8 E3d at 1463.
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The circuit courts' have bent the custody definition to allow use of indicia of
arrest without a finding of "custody" because if a suspect were deeming "in cus-
tody," the stop would have to be supported by the lofty requirement of probable
cause. Probable cause is the level of knowledge required to make an arrest. To
demand such certainty before allowing a potentially dangerous stop would curtail
law enforcement's ability to investigate suspicious individuals based on reason-
able suspicion alone. However, under the Supreme Court's traditional analysis,
persons subjected to the aforementioned indicia of arrest would certainly be "in
custody" and the requirements of probable cause and constitutional warnings
would attach.
Though the Supreme Court, heretofore, has chosen not to address the circuit
courts' expansion of the force allowed before a finding of custody under the
Fourth Amendment, a uniform rule is needed to determine when a Terry stop
becomes custodial for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, and its probable cause
implications, and the Fifth Amendment's attachment of Miranda warnings.
VI. OPTIONS FACING THE SUPREME COURT
The answer to this question has not been squarely addressed by the Court, but
there are several options which may be employed when the Court decides to rule
on this complex issue.' 60 Briefly, the four options that are considered herein are:
(1) Miranda does not, nor was it ever intended to, apply in any valid Terry stop;
(2) the "two-tiered" approach allows officers during a valid Terry stop to deter-
mine "custody" for Miranda purposes prior to finding "custody" for purposes of
the Fourth Amendment; (3) a return to the use-of-force parameters defined in the
1968 version of Terry v. Ohio;"'1 and (4) break the typical Terry encounter into
two phases including an "approach" phase and a "search" phase rather than the
typical analysis which simply examines the intrusion as a whole, employ a uni-
form definition of "custody" to simplify the analysis, and provide a "public safe-
ty exception' to protect the validity of stops where indicia of arrest are required
for officer safety.
In addressing options which the Court may choose to pursue in the future, it is
necessary to establish some guidelines by which to judge the effectiveness of
each option. Mark Godsey, in his Fordham Law Review article, outlines three
reasonable criteria by which to judge each option.1 62 The three criteria are: (1)
how well the option protects the privacy rights of the individual, (2) how well the
option protects the legitimate efforts of law enforcement, and (3) how easy the
rule is for police officers to follow.1" In addition to these criteria, the option will
also be judged by how well it follows established Supreme Court precedent.
160. See Godsey, supra note 1, at 715.
161. See Godsey, supra note 1, at 734-41.
162. Godsey, supra note 1, at 733-34.
163. Godsey, supra note 1, at 734.
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A. Option One: Fourth Amendment Definition of "Custody" Controls
This option is most clearly reflected in the district court's holding in United
States v. Perdue."" This option assumes that the permissive Fourth Amendment
view of "custody" is controlling in a Terry stop, and Miranda is not triggered
until a formal "arrest" is effectuated. 5 In Perdue, as discussed earlier, the
defendant was reasonably suspected of being in possession of narcotics and
weapons and was removed from his vehicle at gunpoint and questioned 16 While
lying on the ground, Perdue gave incriminating responses to police questions. 67
The district court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Berkemer to hold
that Miranda is not triggered during a valid Terry stop." The Court's reasoning
was that since, under the Fourth Amendment, a Terry stop is typically non-threat-
ening and unintrusive, then Miranda cannot be implicated because the situation
never rises to the level of "custody."'6 9
The district court's reasoning, and this option, is obviously flawed because it
assumes the inquiry into "custody" stops after an analysis under the Fourth
Amendment. While the circuit court, in its criticism of the district court's find-
ing, recognized that the traditional view "is that Miranda warnings are simply
not implicated in the context of a valid Terry stop," 7 the previous holdings of
the Supreme Court clearly contemplated a Terry stop only in the unintrusive con-
text of the doctrine's framing. 71 It was never intended that holdings, such as the
one in Berkemer stating that Miranda is not triggered in a "typical" Terry situa-
tion, be applied to the highly intrusive investigatory detentions allowed by the
courts today.'72 Even the Court in Berkemer recognized that to espouse an "all or
nothing" rule excluding or applying Miranda to all investigatory stops would
contain unacceptable drawbacks.'73 Either law enforcement interests would suf-
fer from the requirement of giving Miranda warnings at every traffic stop or the
protections of Miranda would be circumvented by allowing custodial interroga-
tions without the benefit of constitutional warnings.17 ' This tradeoff is unaccept-
able in the opinion of the Supreme Court and therefore requires the rule be left
more flexible to address the specifics of each incident.' The shortcomings in
this option lead us to consider the "two-tiered" approach.
164. 8 F.3d 1455, 1464 (10th Cir. 1993).
165. See Godsey, supra note 1, at 734.
166. Perdue, 8 E3d at 1458-59.
167. Id. at 1459.
168. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984).
169. Id.
170. Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1464.
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B. Option Two: The "Two- Tiered" Approach
Mark Godsey, in his Fordham Law Review article, defines the "two-tiered"
approach as the option which "performs Fourth and Fifth Amendment analysis
separately.""17 The "flagship" decision of this approach is the Tenth Circuit's
opinion in Perdue.'77 This decision gains credibility from the Supreme Court's
language, stated above, in Berkemer, recognizing that a "bright line" rule "has
drawbacks that make it unacceptable."'78 The Tenth Circuit's method for deter-
mining "custody" is a flexible approach because it allows separate analysis of
"custody" under each amendment and allows them to operate independently.'79
In addressing the Perdue stop, the facts of which are stated above, the court rec-
ognized the reasonableness of the officer's actions in "neutralizing" the threat
posed by Mr. Perdue before beginning the investigatory questioning of the Terry
stop. 8 The court stated that "[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require that offi-
cers unnecessarily risk their lives when encountering a suspect whom they reason-
ably believe to be armed and dangerous."'' Therefore, "the seizure was reasonable
at its inception. . . .""' The court recognized, however, that "one cannot ignore the
conclusion ... that by employing an amount of force that reached the boundary
line between a permissible Terry stop and an unconstitutional arrest, the officers
created the 'custodial situation' envisioned by Miranda and its progeny.'
'183
Because of the obviously "custodial" nature of this stop, the court held that
Miranda may be implicated in some highly intrusive, yet constitutionally valid,
Terry stops.18 The court stated that "[p]olice officers must make a choice - if
they are going to take highly intrusive steps to protect themselves from danger,
they must similarly provide protection to their suspects by advising them of their
constitutional rights. 185
Godsey, while admitting that the Tenth Circuit's method scores high marks in
both allowing officers to protect themselves and protecting the rights of individu-
als, criticizes this option because he feels that it is too complex for officers to
determine the nature of the custody in the heat of the moment. 8 ' Godsey com-
plains that "[n]ot only must police officers determine whether they have reason-
able suspicion or probable cause and then use the appropriate level of force, they
must also simultaneously perform Fifth Amendment analysis and ask: Is this a
custodial stop or a non-custodial Terry stop?" '87
Godsey's complaint is flawed both analytically and practically. His assertion
that officers are already consumed with the task of determining whether reason-
176. See Godsey, supra note 1, at 737.
177. 8 E3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1993).
178. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441 (1984).
179. Perdue, 8 F.3dat 1461-62.
180. Id. at 1463.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1462.
183. Id. at 1464.
184. Id. at 1465.
185. Id.
186. See Godsey, supra note 1, at 741.
187. See Godsey, supra note 1, at 728.
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able suspicion or probable cause exists is incorrect. Under most federal circuit
court precedent, if reasonable suspicion exists to effectuate a stop, there is no
need to immediately proceed to a determination of whether probable cause is
present.188 The expansion of the permissible scope of a Terry stop allows the
officer to take all necessary action to "neutralize" the threat that he would have
available under a stop based on probable cause. 189
Once the threat is "neutralized," the officer then has the time to independently
determine if sufficient indicia of arrest have been employed to render the sus-
pect's freedom restrained to a level commensurate with formal arrest. In addi-
tion, this analysis is not performed simultaneously as Godsey believes; but rather
the analysis is performed after the threat has been "neutralized" under a valid
Terry stop, and the suspects have been rendered harmless to the officers or inno-
cent bystanders. This gives the officers ample time to consider whether or not
the suspects should be given Miranda warnings based on the amount of force
used in the stop. Furthermore, the implication that Godsey makes, that officers
are not sufficiently trained to handle such a "legal" determination, ignores the
myriad of legal analyses that American law enforcement officers are required to
make daily.19 To imply that officers are not competent to remember a listing of
indicia of arrest (including handcuffs, drawn weapons, lying prone, and being
placed in a police cruiser) and then provide Miranda warnings to suspects who
have been subjected to such methods, is insulting. 9' Godsey is clearly finding
fault with this option because it leaves the extended boundaries of the modem
Terry stop intact. Godsey is a proponent of returning to the original boundaries
of the Terry stop and allowing only minor intrusions into potentially dangerous
individuals' freedom.
1 92
Despite all its good points, this approach does have two significant flaws.
First, it appears to be inconsistent with current Supreme Court precedent which
holds that "custody" is equivalent for purposes of both the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments and may fall somewhere just short of formal arrest.'93 Secondly,
while the effectiveness of this approach is attractive, it relies on the legal fiction
that "custody" can be viewed differently for the Fourth and the Fifth
Amendments. This appears to be a form of intellectual dishonesty designed to
facilitate the well-intentioned goals of law enforcement while still protecting the
privacy of the individual.
C. Option Three: Return to the 1968 Boundaries of Terry
The third option open to the Supreme Court is best outlined in Mark Godsey's
Fordham Law Review article. 94 Godsey's grand plan is to throw back the legal
clock to 1968 and force officers to return to the limits of a Terry stop restricted
188. See Godsey, supra note 1, at 728.
189. United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1463 (10th Cir. 1993).
190. See Godsey, supra note 1, at 741.
191. See Godsey, supra note 1, at 741.
192. See Godsey, supra note 1, at 741.
193. Terry v. Ohio, 391 U.S. 1 (1968); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
194. See Godsey, supra note 1, at 741.
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to a pat-down of an individual's clothing and no indicia of arrest.19 This argu-
ment, however, ignores the reasons the courts expanded the Terry stop in the first
place. When confronted with the original reasons for expanding the Terry stop,
Mr. Godsey appears to advocate the "ostrich defense.""19 He completely ignores
the tremendous gap that would result in the progression of an investigation if the
expanded Terry stop were restricted.
For example, if an officer observes a vehicle showing signs of theft, such as
broken vent windows or a dismantled steering column, this observation would
raise a "reasonable suspicion" in the mind of the officer. At this time, the officer
would not have sufficient probable cause to arrest the driver of the vehicle for
auto theft but would have the requisite suspicion to conduct a stop in order to
investigate further. The fact that car thieves are often armed and dangerous
would, under Godsey's plan, present the officer with a dangerous dilemma.
Under Godsey's "return to the old Terry approach," the officer would either have
to: (1) do nothing because probable cause to arrest is absent; or (2) attempt to
stop the suspected felon without the protection of any indicia of arrest. If the
officer chooses the latter option, it is likely that the answer to any investigatory
attempt "may be a bullet. 197
In addressing the aforementioned dilemma, nine circuits have determined that
it is unreasonable to require our law enforcement officers to place themselves in
such a needlessly dangerous situation in the performance of their duties. 98 Mr.
Godsey's incredible response to this dilemma is, "[w]hen police officers do not
have probable cause that a potentially dangerous person is engaging in criminal
activity, they do not have to approach the person and put their lives in danger."' 99
This is perhaps the most asinine statement ever made regarding law enforcement
and would surely, if put into practice by police officers, constitute a dereliction of
duty. Mr. Godsey obviously has no regard for the safety of the public to recom-
mend that police not investigate suspicious and potentially dangerous behavior
unless it is clear they can make an immediate arrest. It is quite obvious that this
opinion is unacceptable from the perspective of law enforcement and has been
recognized as such in a majority of the circuit courts."'
D. Option Four.- The Public Safety Exception
The fourth approach consists of two "phases" and derives its justification from
the language in Terry. It also applies a uniform definition of "custody" to both
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and provides a "public safety exception" to
allow officers to use the force necessary to eliminate danger in a Terry stop with-
out invalidating the stop due to a lack of probable cause.
195. See Godsey, supra note 1, at 741.
196. See generally Godsey, supra note 1, at 741.
197. See Godsey, supra note 1, at 741. See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8 (1968).
198. United States v. Perdue, 8 E3d 1455, 1463 (10th Cir. 1993).
199. See Godsey, supra note 1, at 746.
200. Perdue, 8 E3d at 1463.
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The "two-phase" concept is derived from the facts of Terry, where two distinct
aspects of Detective McFadden's confrontation with Terry are evident.0 ' The
first phase was the approach phase, where McFadden effectuated a seizure by
spinning Terry into a non-threatening position. °2 The second phase was the actu-
al search.2"3 In Terry, however, Detective McFadden's actions were only
addressed in terms of the reasonableness of the search conducted on the petition-
er.2"4 The action required to effectuate the search was never addressed.0
The Court stated that when an officer suspects an individual is armed and dan-
gerous, the officer may take "necessary measures to determine whether the person
is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm."2 6 The
Court went on to define the entire intrusion in terms of a "search" which was nec-
essary to discover the weapons. 27 The Court, by omitting any discussion of the
approach required to effectuate the search, left the issue open to interpretation.
The means McFadden used to put himself in a safe position from which to per-
form the limited search was the "spin. 20 8 When McFadden spun Terry around,
he committed a battery on this individual without even enough probable cause to
justify an arrest.209 The Court's only indication that this battery was justified was
their blatant omission of any discussion of this event.210 The language appears to
have been left sufficiently "open" to allow for expansion if "necessary. '21  The
Court used the word "necessary" to describe the limits of the intrusion upon a
suspect. 12 They went on to define what "necessary" means in terms of a search
for weapons.213 All that is necessary to discover weapons is a limited pat-down
of the outer clothing. However, in terms of the action required to place the offi-
cer in a position to perform the limited search, the Court simply authorized what
was "necessary."214 If a battery upon Terry was "necessary" in 1968 to allow
McFadden to position himself where he could safely effectuate a limited search,
then surely the "necessity" of certain indicia of arrest is no less obvious in this
day and age of drive-by shootings and serial killers.
The "two-phased" nature of this test allows the officers to use the force neces-
sary to "neutralize" the threat at the outset of the Terry stop. "Neutralization" of
the threat is a legitimate end recognized even in the restrictive language of
Terry.21 1 In the second phase, once the threat is "neutralized," the officers may
perform the limited search outlined in the original Terry decision.16
201. Terry, 392 U.S. at 6-7.
202. Id. at 7.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 8.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 24.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 7.
209. Id. at 7-8.
210. Id. at 23.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 23-24.
213. Id. at 24.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 29-30.
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The "two-phase" approach is a natural extension of the original holding in
Terry. This is evident because detective McFadden's intrusion actually entailed
two phases as well.2"7 These are the "approach phase," which authorizes what is
reasonably necessary, and the "search phase," which is "strictly circumscribed"
to protect the individual from an unreasonable search.218
Once the "two-phase" Terry stop has been effectuated by neutralizing the threat
and performing a limited search for weapons, the officer would make a decision
regarding Miranda. If during the "approach" phase the suspects were subjected
to one or more indicia of arrest, then Miranda would be triggered due to a find-
ing of "custody" under a uniform definition. If no indicia of arrest were used in
the "approach" phase, the suspects could be questioned under the system envi-
sioned in the Terry opinion, and Miranda would not be triggered.
Finally, a "public safety exception" would be recognized to avoid any problems
under the uniform definition of "custody." When sufficient indicia of arrest are
employed in a reasonable manner for the safety of the officers, under the uniform
definition of "custody," a reasonable person would likely feel his freedom had
been restricted in a way associated with a formal arrest.219 Therefore, the individ-
ual would be found to be "in custody" for purposes of both the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments and would have to be "Mirandized" accordingly. Rather than the
stop being held invalid under Terry for lack of probable cause, due to the use of
indicia of arrest, a "public safety exception" would excuse the officers' reason-
able use of any indicia of arrest.
The "public safety exception" would be based on the balancing test in the lan-
guage of Terry.22 Where the measures taken by officers are found to be neces-
sary for their protection and reasonable when viewed in light of the surrounding
circumstances, then the invasion upon the privacy of the individual will be
excused based on a strong governmental interest in the enforcement of the law
and the protection of its officers.22 '
While this approach sounds complex, and constitutionally it is, its application
is rather simple. As stated previously, in reference to Mr. Godsey's objection,
there is really no analysis by the police officers involved. The officers simply
perform the same "necessary" procedures they have been allowed to use under
the circuit courts' expanded version of Terry. Once the threat is "neutralized"
and a limited search of the suspect is performed, the officer simply determines if
one or more of the roughly four indicia of arrest were used in the "approach"
phase. If they were, then the suspects are given Miranda warnings before ques-
tioning, and a "public safety exception" protects the validity of the stop. If indi-
cia of arrest were not used, Miranda is not triggered.
This approach, while simple to apply, gives deference to the Supreme Court
opinion in Terry, and remains within its dictates by allowing the "necessary"
217. Id.
218. Id. at 30.
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means to effectuate a search while closely circumscribing the search itself122 In
addition, this method also protects the Fifth Amendment right of the individual to
be free from coerced self-incrimination by providing Miranda warnings when
indicia of arrest elevate the stop to a custodial detention.223 Finally, the "public
safety exception" guards the safety interests of law enforcement officers by
allowing them to approach potentially dangerous individuals with the greatest
tactical advantage despite the potential for creating a custodial situation. If a
stop rises to the level of custody due to the indicia of arrest employed, the "pub-
lic safety exception" will allow the intrusion if it is reasonable. The strong gov-
ernmental interest in the safety of law enforcement officers provides the justifi-
cation for a temporary intrusion based on reasonable suspicion. 24
VII. CONCLUSION
The recent expansion in the federal circuit courts of appeal of the indicia of
arrest officers may use during a Terry stop has birthed a conflict. 22' The conflict
originates in the somewhat paradoxical desire to provide law enforcement every
advantage when approaching a potentially dangerous individual while at the
same time protecting that individual's constitutional rights. 22' The inherent
inconsistency in these two goals requires that a balance be struck between oppos-
ing interests.
227
The interest of the government in preventing crime and protecting its officers
must be weighed against the need to protect individuals from unreasonable gov-
ernmental intrusion, and a rule must be created which satisfies both interests.
228
While several options, each possessing attractive characteristics, have been previ-
ously addressed, the author finds option four most compelling.
The fourth option, first and foremost, is consistent with Supreme Court prece-
dent defining "custody" uniformly for purposes of both the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.229 Custody, in the interest of intellectual honesty, must be defined
consistently for purposes of both Amendments. At the same time, however, law
enforcement officers must be allowed to investigate from a tactically advanta-
geous position during a potentially dangerous Terry stop. 20 These ends are met
by employing a "two-phase" analysis. The first "phase" is illustrated in the Terry
decision by the "spin" Detective McFadden used to place himself in a position of
safety while confronting Terry.21 Today's officers, however, are often required to
employ certain indicia of arrest which would create a custodial situation under a
uniform definition of custody. Therefore, a "public safety exception" is neces-
sary to allow officers to use certain indicia of arrest during an investigative stop
222. Id. at 24.
223. Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1465.
224. Id. at 1463.
225. See Godsey, supra note 1, at 715.
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227. Id. at 439.
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based on reasonable suspicion. This "public safety exception" would alleviate
the need to show probable cause in the event the "stop" necessarily rose to the
level of custody. Once the perceived threat is resolved, the officers, based on the
model provided by the Court in Terry, would proceed with the second "phase" of
the stop.232 The second "phase" would consist of the "strictly circumscribed,"
unintrusive search for weapons.2' Once the limited search is performed, the offi-
cers would determine whether sufficient indicia of arrest were utilized such as to
necessitate providing Miranda warnings before any investigatory questioning.
This approach serves the dual purpose of protecting both law enforcement
interests and those of the individual, while maintaining judicial integrity by obvi-
ating the need to rely on the legal fiction that indicia of arrest are not custody.
232. Id. at 25-26.
233. Id.
